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Abstract  
 
This paper investigates the approaches to the recent Kadi case taken by both the 
Court of First Instance and the Advocate General and asks whether the European 
Court of Justice made the right choice with regard to the case’s implications for the 
relationship between European and international law. It argues that the Court’s 
judgement of 3 September 2008 in Kadi is to be welcomed, also from an internatio-
nal perspective. It rightly rejected the approach presented by the Court of First 
Instance, which, albeit stressing the importance of the UN Charter, ultimately turned 
out to be a ‘false friend’ of international law. By largely following the Advocate 
General’s Opinion, the Court maintained the integrity and the superior human rights 
standard of the EU legal order. Without jeopardizing the compliance of the Member 
States with their UN Charter obligations right away, it sent a clear warning signal to 
the United Nations Security Council to exhaust its potential for reform of the targeted 
sanction regime to the fullest. The Court showed that in an interdependent world of 
multilevel governance, the different components cannot ‘pass by each other like 
ships in the night’. In the face of threats like global terrorism like the threat of terrorism 
as well as undue curtailing of human rights, we are all in the same boat together 
after all.  
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Introduction: The Kadi Case, a Counterpoint of Legal Orders 
 
The issue of targeted anti-terror sanctions has assumed a prominent place in 
scholarly and public debate over the past years. The most drastic statements 
describe assets freezing and travel bans as “a civil death penalty”,1 destroying the 
livelihood and reputation of the persons concerned and thus turning them into 
Agambian homines sacri, i.e. outlaws “without rights and no avenue to recover their 
presence in society”.2 It is further alleged that a permanent state of emergency in 
the ‘war against terror’ serves as a questionable justification for this.3 Especially the 
way these sanctions are imposed and maintained at the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) has kindled this criticism, often spawning analogies to the works of 
Franz Kafka, where the individual usually finds himself helplessly at the mercy of 
obscure and inaccessible bureaucratic structures.4 
At the core of this highly charged debate we find the case concerning Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi (as well as the Al Barakaat Foundation), which has been ruled upon 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on 3 September 2008.5 Here, the highest 
Court of the European Union (EU) was – “in a more dramatic way than ever before”6 
– “confronted with the complexities of a world system of governance established at 
three levels, the United Nations (UN) level, represented primarily by the Security 
Council, the Community level and lastly the national level”.7 As will be argued, it is 
precisely this “Mehrebenenproblematik”8 (multilevel governance problem) which 
                                                 
1 As it has been called by Council of Europe Rapporteur Dick Marty in an interview, B. Kruse, 
‘Zivile Todesstrafe’, sueddeutsche.de, 12 November 2007, retrieved 23 August 2008, 
<www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/753/142440/>. 
2 W. Vlcek, ‘Acts to Combat the Financing of Terrorism: Common Foreign and Security Policy 
at the European Court of Justice’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2006, p. 
506, referring to G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel 
Heller-Roazen, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998.  
3 See J. Klabbers, ‘Kadi Justice at the Security Council?’, International Organizations Law 
Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2008, pp. 303-304, also drawing on the philosophical considerations of 
G. Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2005.  
4 See A. von Arnauld, ‘UN-Sanktionen und gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Grundrechtsschutz: Die 
“Soweit-Rechtsprechung” des Europäischen Gerichts Erster Instanz’, Archiv des Völkerrechts, 
Vol. 44, No. 2, 2006, pp. 211-212; Vlcek, op.cit., p. 507; also I. Ley, ‘Legal Protection Against the 
UN-Security Council Between European and International Law: A Kafkaesque Situation?’, 
German Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2007, pp. 279-294. 
5 ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakkat v Council and Commission, judgement of 3 September 2008, 
Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415-05 P (not yet reported). The cases on Kadi and Al Barakaat 
had been joined in the appeals phase. However, for reasons of conciseness, this paper will 
refer only to the judgements and the Advocate General’s Opinion as pertaining to Kadi. 
6 C. Tomuschat, ‘“Case Law”: European Court of First Instance, Judgment of 21 September 
2005’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2006, p. 537. 
7 Ibid. 
8 S. Alber, ‘Kurzbesprechung der Schlussanträge des Generalanwalts Poiares Maduro vom 
16.1.2008’, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2008, p. 165.  
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makes this case a unique counterpoint in legal history,9 that is, a situation in which 
several legal orders apply simultaneously and have to be reconciled so as to 
produce harmony instead of discord.10 How difficult this task is has become 
apparent in the two starkly divergent approaches presented to the ECJ in the legal 
process leading up to its judgement: the judgement of the Court of First Instance 
(CFI)11 stressing the primacy of the UN Charter and the Opinion of Advocate General 
(AG) Poiares Maduro12 stressing the autonomy of the European Community (EC) 
legal order, revealing a controversy which at times strongly harks back to “the literary 
debate during the past century on monism and dualism”.13 But the question now is: 
“[In] today’s time of multifaceted international interdependence”,14 which 
approach is to be preferred, and did the ECJ choose the right one? 
Hence, in shifting the focus from certain aspects such as international security 
and human rights to the ‘big picture’ of this very “Mehrebenenproblematik”, this 
paper will concentrate on the merits of these two distinct understandings of the 
relationship between the European and the international sphere (especially the 
U n ite d  N a t i o n s) .  I t w i l l  b e  a r g u ed  th a t the ECJ made the right decision in largely 
following the Advocate General in its judgement, for both doctrinal and practical 
reasons. To this end, the paper will be structured in the following way: First, the 
opposing positions taken in the judgement of the CFI and the AG’s Opinion will be 
compared and critically assessed as to how they conceive of the relationship 
between the two legal orders including the advantages and disadvantages of their 
respective reasoning. This will be followed by an appraisal of the ECJ judgement and 
its legal aftermath as well as the short and long-term ramifications that are likely to 
follow on the international level, before drawing a conclusion. 
                                                 
9 The notion of ‘counterpunctual law’ was coined by Miguel Maduro himself, meaning the 
harmonious interplay between the legal orders of the EU Member States and the European 
Union itself; see L.M. Poiares Maduro, 'Der Kontrapunkt im Dienst eines europäischen 
Verfassungspluralismus',  Europarecht, No. 1, 2007, pp. 19-23; and L.M. Poiares Maduro, 
‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in N. Walker (ed.), 
Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003, pp. 501-537. In the present context, 
however, it will concern the interplay between the international and the European legal 
orders. 
10 Referring to the metaphor used by V. Kronenberger, ‘Introduction’, in V. Kronenberger 
(ed.),  The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony?, The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001, pp. XI-XIV. 
11 CFI, Kadi v Council and Commission, Judgment of 21 September 2005, Case T-315/01, 
European Court Reports 2005, p. II-03649. 
12 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, delivered on 16 January 2008, Kadi v Council and 
Commission, Case C-402/05 P, retrieved 1 July 2008,  
<eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005C0402:EN:HTML>. 
13 A. Ott, ‘Thirty Years of Case-Law by the European Court of Justice on International Law: A 
Pragmatic Towards Integration’, in Vincent Kronenberger (ed.), The European Union and the 
International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony?, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001, p. 98.  
14 “[In] [d]er heutigen Zeit mit ihrer vielfältigen internationalen Verflechtung”, C. Tomuschat, 
‘Die Europäische Union und ihre völkerrechtliche Bindung’, Europäische Grundrechte-
Zeitschrift, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2007, p. 1. 
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Between Misapplication and Isolation: Two Approaches to Solve Kadi 
 
With the ECJ being faced with a unique dilemma on how to deal with the review of 
acts that are a “one-to-one”15 transposition of Security Council resolutions (so-called 
non-autonomous sanctions), the solutions proposed by the CFI and the AG to solve 
the dilemma arrived at two completely opposite conclusions. Indeed, their 
respective reasonings differ considerably from one another, which is also a clear 
indication of the complexity of the issue at hand.  
To grasp this divergence, and to determine which solution is preferable in 
dealing with the “Mehrebenenproblematik”, first the judgement of the CFI and 
subsequently the Advocate General’s Opinion will be critically scrutinized as to the 
implications they have for the relationship between European and International law. 
 
The Court of First Instance: A ‘False Friend’ of International Law? 
 
In its judgement of 21 September 2005, the CFI trod on new ground concerning the 
relationship between the EU and UN legal orders as well as international law in 
general. Its reasoning can be deconstructed in the following way: first, the CFI chose 
as a starting point the UN Charter, which it considered to have a binding and 
supreme character over both the Member States and the EC.16 Resulting from this, it 
presented a changed hierarchy of norms in the EC legal order, granting itself a very 
limited scope of review against what it considers to be jus cogens, i.e. peremptory 
norms of international law.17 With a threshold this high, the CFI eventually opined that 
no human rights violations could be detected.18 It will be contended that the CFI 
ended up being a ‘false friend’ of international law, while sacrificing most of the 
legal protection offered by the EC legal order. For the purposes of this paper – 
scrutinising the relationship it establishes between the European and international 
legal order – there are three main remarks to be made.  
First, by taking the United Nations Charter as the starting point, and constantly 
keeping in mind the setup of the UN throughout its argumentation, the CFI’s 
reasoning is aimed at enabling maximum compliance of both the EC and the 
Member States with the Charter. The CFI applied the relevant provisions, especially 
the “synergy of Articles 25 and 103”,19 on the primacy of the UN Charter and binding 
decisions taken in accordance with it in a very straightforward manner, not diverting 
                                                 
15 von Arnauld, op.cit., p. 201 (“eins zu eins”). 
16 CFI, Kadi, op.cit., para. 178-208. 
17 CFI, Kadi, op.cit., para. 209-232. 
18 CFI, Kadi, op.cit., para. 233-292. 
19 A s  i t  h a s  b e e n  c a l l e d  b y  M .  R e i s m a n n ,  ‘ T h e  Constitutional Crisis of the United Nations’, 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, No. 1, 1993, p. 93. 
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from established public international law doctrine.20 This can be seen as consistent 
with the traditionally international law friendly attitude of the European Courts, 
recognising “that the European Community must respect international law in the 
exercise of its powers”.21 Furthermore, referring to the jurisprudence concerning the 
EC and its being bound by the GATT, even when the EC was not yet a member, 
contributed to the soundness of this argument.22 It is here that the “Völkerrecht-
freundlichkeit”23 (“friendly attitude towards international law”) of the judgement 
manifests itself most clearly and most uncontroversially. Most important is the fact 
that it sets the UN Charter apart from other international agreements and therefore 
appreciates its special character as a global constitutional document.24  
Following up on that, it is to be welcomed that the CFI underscored the wide 
discretionary power the Security Council wields in the exercise of its mandate. As 
Tomuschat rightly remarks, one should not forget that “an integral element of the rule 
of law [is also] not to push judicial review beyond the limitations which restrict its 
jurisdiction”25 and that “[t]o assess whether a threat to international peace an 
security exists is indeed essentially a discretionary decision”26 requiring “a 
considerable margin of appreciation in determining a state of emergency […] and 
the measures required to deal with the situation”.27 These measures, as is evident 
from the Charter, can even lead to a derogation from the general prohibition to use 
                                                 
20 Tomuschat, ‘Case Law’, op.cit., p. 541; see also R. Bernhardt, ‘Art. 103’, in Bruno Simma et 
al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2002, Vol. 2, pp. 1294-1302. 
21 ECJ, Poulsen and Diva Navigation, Judgment of 24 November 1992, Case C-286/90, 
European Court Reports 1992, p. I-06019, para. 9; see also ECJ, Kupferberg, Judgement of 26 
October 1982, Case 104/81, European Court Reports 1982, p. 03641; and ECJ, Haegeman, 
Judgement of 30 April 1974, Case 181-73, European Court Reports 1974, p. 00449. 
22 Tomuschat, ‘Case Law’, op.cit., p. 542; for a differing view see M. Nettesheim, ‘U.N. 
Sanctions Against Individuals – A Challenge to the Architecture of European Union 
Governance’, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2007, pp. 585-587. 
23 Ley, op.cit., p. 285. 
24 On the constitutional quality of the UN Charter see e.g. P.-M. Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional 
Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited’, Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law, Vol. 1, 1997, pp. 1-33; T. Franck, ‘Is the UN Charter a Constitution?’, in Jochen 
Frowein et al. (eds.), Verhandeln für den Frieden / Negotiating for Peace: Liber Amicorum 
Tono Eitel, Berlin, Springer, 2003, pp. 95-106; and S. Kadelbach & T. Kleinlein, ‘Überstaatliches 
Verfassungsrecht: Zur Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht’, Archiv des Völkerrechts, Vol. 44, 
No. 3, 2006, pp. 236-266. 
25 Tomuschat, ‘Case Law’, op.cit., p. 544. 
26 Ibid., p. 545.  
27 M .  K a r a y i g i t ,  ‘ T h e  Yusuf and Kadi Judgements: The Scope of the EC Competences in 
Respect of Restrictive Measures’, Legal issues of Economic Integration, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2006, p. 
398. 
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force in international relations,28 entailing not only military but also considerable 
numbers of civilian casualties.29  
Secondly, however, the caveat that has to follow immediately after this point is 
the question whether there is any form of restraint of the Security Council that could 
be exercised by the European Courts. As it has been formulated by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadić case: 
“[T]he Security Council plays a pivotal role and exercises a very wide 
discretion under [Article 39 of the UN Charter]. But this does not mean that 
its powers are unlimited. The Security Council is an organ of an 
international organization, established by a treaty which serves as a 
constitutional framework for that organization. The Security Council is thus 
subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however broad its powers 
under the constitution may be. […] In any case, neither the text nor the 
spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus 
(unbound by law).”30 
 
Indeed, according to the UN Charter, the Security Council has to act “in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”31 in carrying out 
its mandate, which can be expected to “include norms that have been 
subsequently treated as jus cogens.”32 The CFI used this limitation of the Security 
Council’s discretion to introduce its own jus cogens standard for review. Heralded by 
some as “[t]he strongest argument in favour of limitations on the powers of the 
Security Council”,33 it is also the most controversial one. 
To begin with, even though the existence of a body of peremptory norms as 
such seems less and less disputed in international law and finds a strong basis in 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), there is no clear 
delimitation between the rules actually constituting jus cogens and those that do 
                                                 
28 UN Charter, Art. 2, para. 4; legitimate self-defence being the only other exception, Art. 51.  
29 Note that e.g. the UN-mandated Gulf War of 1990/91 involved over 2,200 Iraqi civilian 
causalities and almost 6,000 wounded, L. Freedman & E. Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy 
and War in the New World Order, 1990-1991, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 
324-329; in a similar vein Alber, op.cit., p. 16; and Tomuschat, ‘Die EU und ihre völkerrechtliche 
Bindung’, op.cit., p. 7. 
30 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, Case IT-94-1-I, para. 28; see also ICJ, Namibia (South West 
Africa), Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16., para. 115.  
31 UN Charter, Art. 24, para. 2.  
32 UN General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commission, Official Records, Sixty-
first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10), 2006, p. 422. 
33 A. Hudson, ‘Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Regime: 
Violating Human Rights’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2007, p. 212.  
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not.34 In any case, more or less undisputed appear to be the prohibition of 
aggression, slavery, genocide, piracy as well as the respect for elementary human 
rights and norms of international humanitarian law.35 In view of the uncertainty 
surrounding the subject, the CFI thus trod on thin ice when it boldly embarked on 
reviewing indirectly UN Security Council resolutions under its very own notion of what 
this jus cogens should be.  
Nevertheless, the result might have been more acceptable if the assessment 
had been done thoroughly and in accordance with the VCLT, i.e. determining for 
each right whether it is “accepted and recognized by the international community 
of States as a whole”36 as being of a peremptory character. The CFI, however, did 
nothing of this kind. Instead, it simply referred to the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of nuclear weapons,37 which does 
not mention jus cogens at all, but instead deals with the customary law status of 
certain core parts of international humanitarian law.38 
From this flawed starting point, the CFI proceeded to the different human 
rights breaches alleged by the applicant. Concerning the right to property, instead 
of relying on the International Covenants on Human Rights, the CFI referred only to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which can also be described as an 
“abortive”39 approach. More importantly, however, despite its claim only to review 
the challenged acts by a standard of whatever it understands to be jus cogens the 
CFI went “much further in its examination than would correspond to the premises 
which it adopted as guidance”,40 by dwelling e.g. on the temporary nature of the 
                                                 
34 International scholarship is virtually unanimous in agreeing that here is no consolidated 
agreement on the scope of jus cogens yet, see e.g. P.-M. Dupuy, Droit international public, 
7th edition, Paris, Dalloz, 2004, p. 285; P. Tavernier, ‘L’identification des règles fondamentales, 
un problème résolu?’, in Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamen-
tal Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, Leiden, 
M a r ti n us  Ni j h o f f,  2 0 0 6,  p .  1;  M.  B o s s uy t &  J .  W o u t er s ,  Grondlijnen van internationaal recht, 
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005, p. 93; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th edition, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 490; H. von Heinegg, ‘Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge 
als Hauptquelle des Völkerrechts’, in Knut Ipsen et al. (eds.), Völkerrecht, 5th edition, Munich, 
C.H. Beck, 2004, p. 186; and M. Shaw, International Law, 5th edition, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, p. 115-116; also (albeit less sceptical) J. Frowein, ‘Jus Cogens’, in Rudolf 
Bernhardt & P. Macalister-Smith (eds.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam, 
Elsevier, 1997, Vol. 3, pp. 65-69. 
35 von Heinegg, op.cit., p. 193; see in detail UN General Assembly, Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, paras. 374-376. 
36 VCLT, Art. 53.  
37 CFI, Kadi, op.cit., para. 231. 
38 ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ 
Reports 1996, p. 226, para. 79. 
39 Tomuschat, ‘Case Law’, op.cit., p. 547. 
40 Ibid., p. 548. 
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sanctions,41 or the review mechanism at the UN level.42 It gets even worse, when 
concerning the remaining two claims that “the Court does not even make an 
attempt to show that [these] right[s] have the nature of jus cogens”,43 but simply 
reverts to ECJ44 and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence.45 
Under such circumstances, one could question whether the CFI acting as a 
friend of international law is indeed beneficial to international law. In any case, one 
has to agree with van den Herik that the CFI’s reasoning “adds to the argument that 
national and regional courts are in fact not the proper place for the review of 
Security Council measures.”46 In a worst-case scenario, the CFI approach has the 
potential of “undermining the system of collective security”,47 since it gives the 
judiciary the power of “ordering the state to act contrary to the [UNSC] sanctions 
committee’s lists”.48 Moreover, the imprecise boundaries of jus cogens might be 
abused by other (less independent) courts among UN members to find a justification 
to escape fulfilment of their obligation in the collective effort to combat international 
terrorism and thus create loopholes and safe havens for terrorists.49 Furthermore, if 
various domestic and regional courts started applying their very own jus cogens, this 
would lead to the proliferation of notions of what constitutes the absolute core of 
international law, which would raise the spectre of fragmentation of international 
law.  
Thirdly, notwithstanding its questionable application of jus cogens, the fiercest 
criticism, which has also spawned several high-level reports,50 had been on the 
actual result of the judgement, namely that the applicant’s claims were dismissed 
altogether, therefore refusing him legal protection against the sanctions which 
                                                 
41 CFI, Kadi, op.cit., para. 248. 
42 Ibid., paras. 249-250. 
43 Tomuschat, ‘Case Law’, op.cit., p. 549. 
44 CFI, Kadi, op.cit., para. 255. 
45 Ibid., para. 287. 
46 L. van den Herik, ‘The Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions Regimes: In Need of Better 
Protection of the Individual’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2007, p. 801 
(emphasis in the original).  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., p. 799. 
49 See similarly C. Möllers, ‘Der EuG konstitutionalisiert die Vereinten Nationen: Anmerkung zu 
den Urteilen des EuG vom 21.09.2005, Rs. T-315/01 und T-315/01’, Europarecht, Vol. 41, No. 3, 
p. 428. 
50 See I. Cameron, The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United 
Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, Report commissioned by the Council of 
Europe, 6 February 2006.; B. Fassbender, Targeted Sanctions and Due Process, Study 
commissioned by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 20 March 2006, retrieved 28 July 
2008, <www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.pdf>; and UN General Assembly / Security 
Council, Annex to the letter dated 19 May 2006 from the Permanent Representatives of 
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the 
General Assembly and the President of the Security Council: Thomas Bierstecker & Sue Eckert, 
Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedures, White Paper prepared 
by the Watson Institute Targeted Sanctions Project, Brown University, 30 March 2006, A/60/887 
– S/2006/331 (2006), 14 June 2006. 
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obviously had grave consequences for his life, in result “leav[ing] the individual 
without effective legal protection”.51 Without repeating the legitimate criticism 
expressed in these reports, it has to be conceded that the CFI’s seemingly friendly 
attitude towards international law came at a very high price, namely sacrificing the 
protection of human rights as guaranteed by the EC legal order, from which the 
applicants in e.g. in the Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran (OMPI)52 
and  Sison53 cases had fully benefited due to a less direct link between the 
Community measures and Security Council resolutions (so-called non-autonomous 
sanctions, where UN members enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in terms of 
implementation).  
In sum, contrasting this sacrifice with a closer look at what has actually been 
won, namely a questionable and “adventurous”54 application of international law 
leading to a quasi-“submission”55 of the EC legal order to a de facto unaccountable 
Security Council, evidently begs the question: is this really worth it? In any case, 
against such a backdrop, the temptation is considerable to look for another solution 
that is paying less attention to obligations under international law and doing more to 
protect the values enshrined in the EC’s legal order. 
 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro: Outsourcing the Problem? 
 
This temptation to seek a more fundamental rights-friendly solution seems also to 
have motivated AG Poiares Maduro’s reasoning in the Opinion he delivered on 18 
January 2008 concerning Mr Kadi’s appeal to the ECJ. In contrast to the CFI, the 
Advocate General chose as his argumentative starting point the EC legal order, 
stressing its autonomy.56 This led to an argumentation based on the superior 
protection of the individual in the EC legal order,57 and in turn resulted in the 
detection of several breaches of fundamental rights by the EC acts implementing 
the sanctions, which should accordingly be annulled.58 In the following critical 
appraisal, it will be pointed out that while the Opinion is consistent in itself, it 
theoretically risks leading to the isolation of the EC legal order and ultimately to an 
outsourcing of the problem. 
                                                 
51 C. Eckes, ‘Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures - The Yusuf and Kadi 
Judgments of the Court of First Instance’, European Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2008, p. 92. 
52 CFI, O r g a n i s a t i o n  d e s  M o d j a h e d i n e s  d u  p e u p l e  d ' I r a n  v  C o u n c i l , Judgment of 12 
December 2006, Case T-228/02, European Court Reports 2006, p. II-04665. 
53 CFI, Sison v Council, Judgment of 11 July 2007, T-47/03 (not yet reported). 
54 J. D’Aspremont & F. Dopagne, ‘Kadi: The ECJ's Reminder of the Elementary Divide between 
Legal Orders’, International Organization Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2008, p. 378. 
55 See K. Schmalenbach, ‘Normentheorie vs. Terrorismus: Der Vorrang des UN-Rechts vor EU-
Recht’, Juristenzeitung, Vol. 61, No. 7, 2006, p. 352 (“Unterordnung”). 
56 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, op.cit., paras. 21-24. 
57Ibid., paras. 25-40. 
58 Ibid., paras. 41-55. 
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As appears from the previous elaborations, the way international law has 
been treated by AG Poiares Maduro in the Kadi case differs fundamentally from the 
way it was treated by the CFI, with the most obvious difference being that the 
Advocate General spends far fewer words on it than the CFI. On the contrary, his 
judgement remains, most of the time, firmly within the realms of EC law. However, 
also this silence on the matter is quite revealing in the way he conceives of the 
relationship between international and European law. Three main observations are 
to be made in this respect.  
First, as has been pointed out, the basis of AG Poiares Maduro’s argument is 
the autonomy of the EC legal order. He kept stressing throughout that it was even a 
so-called “municipal legal order”.59 Thus, even though “[t]his does not mean, 
however, that the Community’s legal order and the international legal order pass by 
each other like ships in the night”,60 in his view, the Court’s duty “first and foremost, is 
to preserve the constitutional framework of the [EC] Treaty”.61  
This can be seen as the latest of several steps in EC jurisprudence of severing 
the EC legal order from the international one from which it originated. The 
formulation of “a new legal order of international law”62 in van Gend en Loos still 
gave the impression that it formed part of public international law as a sort of lex 
specialis63 or self-contained regime.64 But only shortly thereafter, the judgement in 
Costa v ENEL established a trend more towards something resembling a domestic 
legal order by stressing that “[b]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC 
Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the treaty, 
became an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and which their 
courts are bound to apply.”65 Eventually, the ECJ started referring to the EC Treaty as 
the “basic constitutional charter”66 of the Community legal order. Also European law 
scholars concluded that in spite of its origins in public international law, EC law had 
emancipated into an autonomous legal order,67 a quality the ECJ was “particularly 
                                                 
59 Ibid., paras, 21, 22, 23, 37 and 39. 
60 Ibid., para. 22. 
61 Ibid., para. 24. 
62 ECJ, van Gend en Loos, Judgment of 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, European Court Reports 
1962 (English special edition), p. 00001, para. 9 (emphasis added).  
63 See UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83, Annex: International Law Commission, ‘Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, A/Res/56/83 (2001), 12 
December 2001, Art. 55. 
64 S u c h  a s  e . g .  t h e  r u l e s  o n  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s ,  a s  s t r e s s e d  i n  I C J ,  Tehran Hostages, 
Judgement of 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports 1980, p. 3, para. 86.  
65 ECJ, Costa v ENEL, Judgment of 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, European Court Reports (English 
special edition), p. 00614, para. 8.  
66 e.g. ECJ, Les Verts, Judgment of 23 April 1986, Case 294/83, European Court Reports 1986, 
p. 01339, para. 23.  
67 See e.g. Herdegen, Matthias, Europarecht, 6th edition, Munich, C. H. Beck, 2004, p. 68.  
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insistent on defending”.68 With regard to the effects of international law therein, it has 
been observed that this stance strongly resonates the German bridge metaphor 
attributed to justice Paul Kirchhof, whereby “judges operating within the putatively 
closed entity have the function of guards deciding whether or not a legal act from a 
foreign power may pass”,69 with the guard “exclusively apply[ing] his own 
standards.”70  
However, one cannot help but develop some degree of suspicion vis-à-vis this 
over-emphasising of the EC’s legal autonomy. Even tough not the focus of the 
discussion here, the difficult task that the Council, Commission, CFI and AG 
encountered in finding some “Magic Mixture”71 of articles as a legal basis for EC 
competence to implement targeted sanctions is telling: at one point elements from 
the  intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar always 
came into play.72 The circumstance that “even when acting within the scope of the 
CFSP, the Member States must respect EC law”73 does not offer much consolation, 
seeing that the CFSP is excluded from the ECJ’s jurisdiction,74 and thus evidently does 
not quite constitute a “complete system of judicial protection”75 in this respect. 
Besides that, the fact that any amendment of the so-called “constitutional charter” 
has to be made by unanimous decision of the Member States acting as the 
seigneurs des traités76 also serves as an indication that “the Community legal order is 
still dominated by the spirit of international law”77 to a certain extent. In the same 
vein, certain scholars contend that even though “it is reasonable to conclude that 
EC law operates as a closed system […] for most practical purposes”,78 this still does 
not make it “a self-contained regime since there remain scenarios in which a 
fallback on state responsibility remains feasible and necessary, and since such a 
fallback is not precluded by peculiar characteristics of the Community order.”79 
Lastly, what also fits uneasily with this ‘municipal’ quality of EC law is the fact that e.g. 
                                                 
68 Craig, Paul & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th edition, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 202.  
69 Nettesheim, op.cit., p. 580.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Referring to the CFI’s judgement, Eckes, op.cit., p. 79. 
72 See Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, op.cit., paras, 11-15; CFI, Kadi, op.cit., paras. 64-
135; note also ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat, op.cit., paras. 158-236, especially para. 226. 
73 Craig & de Búrca, op.cit., p. 190; based on ECJ, Centro-Com, Judgement of 14 January 
1994, Case C-124/95, European Court Reports 1997, p. I-00081, para. 25. 
74 EU Treaty, Art. 46 juncto Art. 35. 
75 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, op.cit., para. 31. 
76 EU Treaty, Art. 48, para. 3. 
77 B. de Witte, ‘Rules of Change in International Law: How Special is the European 
Community?’, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 25, 1994, p. 331; see also J. 
Allain, ‘The European Court is an International Court’, Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 
68, No. 3, 1999, pp. 249-274. 
78 B. Simma & D. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
International Law’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2006, p. 519. 
79 Ibid.; e.g. the “continuous violation of Community law by an EC Member State”, p. 517. 
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the German Constitutional Court through its Solange-II ruling still reserves the right to 
review Community acts should the EC cease to exercise a materially equivalent 
degree of fundamental rights protection.80 Hence, the autonomy of the ‘municipal’ 
EC legal order may not be as absolute as AG Poiares Maduro makes it appear. 
Therefore, the conclusion that the legal effects of review will remain confined to the 
EC, while the law of treaties and state responsibility will deal with the outside world, 
might be too black-and-white a depiction for two legal orders with an undeniable 
grey area still between them. 
Secondly, however, introducing the Solange jurisprudence of the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the discussion of the way Kadi was approached by AG 
Poiares Maduro also reveals one of its greatest merits. It is important to note that 
even though the German Constitutional Court in Solange-II did not relinquish its right 
of review, it decided to refrain from exercising it for as long as the EC legal order 
maintained a level of protection that it deemed appropriate.81 Essentially the same 
argument was used in the ECtHR’s Bosphorus ruling, stating that measures taken to 
comply with international obligations such as UN sanctions are “justified as long as 
the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards 
both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their 
observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for 
which the [European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)] provides.”82 But 
accepting an external protection standard requires a “leap of faith”83 by the 
reviewing instance desisting from the ordinary conduct of its mandate. However, the 
ECtHR also ruled that  
“any such presumption can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, it is considered that the protection of [ECHR] rights was 
manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international co-
operation would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a 
‘constitutional instrument of European public order’ in the field of human 
rights”.84  
 
AG Poiares Maduro indeed hinted at the possibility of ‘solanging’85 the issue by 
suggesting at the end of his Opinion that if there “had been a genuine and effective 
mechanism of judicial control by an independent tribunal at the level of the United 
Nations, then this might have released the Community from the obligation to provide 
                                                 
80  Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court), Solange-II, Decision of 22 
October 1986, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Vol. 73, 1987, p. 387.  
81 See Herdegen, op.cit., p. 208.  
82 ECtHR, Bosphorus v Ireland, Judgement of 30 June 2005, Application no. 45036/98, 
European Human Rights Reports, Vol. 42, 2006, p. 1, para. 155. 
83 von Arnauld, op.cit., p. 208 (“Vertrauensvorschuss”). 
84 ECtHR, Bosphorus v Ireland, op.cit., para. 156. 
85 This neologism was coined, to the author’s knowledge, by L. Gradoni, ‘Making Sense of the 
Practice of “Solanging” in International Law’, contribution to a panel discussion at the Hague 
Joint Conference on Contemporary Issues of International Law, The Hague, 29 June 2007. 
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for judicial control of implementing measures that apply within the Community legal 
order.”86 But there is no denying that with the ICJ not being accessible to 
individuals87 (and generally somewhat reluctant when it comes to “[s]econd-
[g]uessing the Security Council”)88 and the Security Council itself still only providing 
“a purely political mechanism”89 for review, there is no judicial remedy whatsoever 
available at the UN level. Therefore, there is a point in saying that the UN does not 
(yet) deserve such a leap of faith.90 Thus, when construing it as a clear-cut “choice 
between a fully developed legal system for the protection of individual rights, [and] 
an embryonic system ill-equipped to deal with instances of direct individual 
grievances”,91 AG Poiares Maduro obviously took the right choice. For him the Kadi 
case is in no way more special than for instance Sison or OMPI. From a purely EC law 
point of view, this choice prevents external interference from corroding a more 
deeply integrated legal system. From an international human rights point of view, it 
shifts the balance from international security concerns to the protection of the 
individual. Even though the AG does not claim to review the UNSC resolutions as 
such, at least adversely affected individuals can seek remedies at the regional/ 
domestic level against the implementing measures.  
This unequivocal choice by the Advocate General in favour of the EC’s legal 
autonomy and its more sophisticated human rights protection also leads to the third 
observation. At first glance, his strictly dualistic reasoning might seem to result in a 
drastic simplification of the problem.92 However, it is argued here that it instead 
defers the problem to another level, by letting public international law deal with the 
ulterior “repercussions”93 of his argumentation. Had the ECJ indeed annulled the 
contested regulation as far as it concerned Mr Kadi, his assets would have been 
unfrozen and the travel ban lifted. Other listed persons with standing before the EC 
Courts could bring challenges as well. However, they would remain on the Security 
Council’s list, with the EU Member States being barred from implementing the 
sanctions individually.94 This might not only “inconvenience the Community and its 
Member States in their dealings on the international stage”95, as the AG put it, but 
                                                 
86 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, op.cit., para. 54.  
87 Statute of the ICJ, Art. 34; see also Tomuschat, ‘Case Law’, op.cit., p. 538. 
88 In detail K. Roberts, ‘Second-Guessing the Security Council: The International Court of 
Justice and Its Powers of Judicial Review’, Pace International Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1995, 
pp. 281-327; note that the ICJ ultimately refrained from reviewing UNSC resolutions in ICJ, 
Lockerbie, Request for the indication of provisional measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ 
Reports 1992, p. 3., paras. 43-45. 
89 Cameron, op.cit., p. 6. 
90 von Arnauld, op.cit., pp. 208-209; see also Nettesheim, op.cit., p. 592. 
91 Tomuschat, ‘Case Law’, op.cit., p. 544. 
92 Alber, op.cit., p. 166. 
93 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, op.cit., para. 38. 
94 See ECJ, Centro-Com,  op.cit., para. 25; and ECJ, Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT), 
Judgment of 18 June 1991, Case C-260/89, European Court Reports 1991, p. I-02925, para. 41.  
95 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, op.cit., para. 39. 
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would amount to nothing less than forcing 27 UN member states to violate their 
obligations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. With the Security Council reiterating 
“that sanctions are an important tool under the Charter of the United Nations in the 
maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, and [stressing] in 
this regard the need for robust implementation of the measures […] as a significant 
tool in combating terrorist activity”,96 this could be seen as an indication that it would 
not regard non-compliance as a petty offence.  
It may be defensible that the dualist approach can be maintained in general, 
i.e. that in spite of pacta sunt servanda,97 it is up to the parties to decide how to live 
up to their international obligations internally, with failure to comply again being 
regulated by international law (state responsibility or special rules).98 However, the 
Advocate General fails to recognise here the special nature of the United Nations in 
the sector of international security, which cannot be dealt with just like any 
organisation.99 In addition, he fails to appreciate the lack of room for 
manoeuvrability in the present case. Be it justified or not, there is no changing the 
fact that in the Kadi case the EC and the Member States do simply not have any 
leeway when implementing the sanctions. In this case the EC is indeed just the 
“transmission belt”100 of the Security Council. Hence, unlike international trade under 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework, there are no alternative solutions 
conceivable such as “payment of compensation or suspension of concessions”.101 In 
the realm of international security, such options would be plainly absurd.  
Lastly, even though such judicially forced non-compliance would in AG 
Poiares Maduro’s reasoning not lead to the fragmentation of international law (what 
is not applied cannot be fragmented), the danger for abuse remains just as with the 
CFI’s application of jus cogens. If the AG’s approach would be followed by other 
courts, they would not even have (to pretend) to apply a universal standard. 
Instead, it would be every UN member state’s respective constitution that could 
serve as an excuse for escaping Chapter VII obligations, which could prove to be 
quite an “explosive force” for the UN architecture.102 
                                                 
96 UN, Security Council Resolution 1822/2008, S/Res/1822 (2008), 30 June 2008, 9th 
perambulatory clause.  
97 VCLT, Art. 26. 
98 A. Schaus, ‘Article 27 – Droit interne et respect des traités’, in Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein 
(eds.), Les Conventions de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités, Brussels, Bruylant, 2006, Vol. 2, pp. 
1132-1137. 
99 Alber, op.cit., p. 166.  
100 von Arnauld, op.cit., p. 203 (“Transmissionsriemen”). 
101 ECJ, Omega Air, Judgement of 12 March 2002, Joined cases C-27/00 and C-122/00, 
European Court Reports 2002, p. I-02569, para. 89. These ‘alternative’ options are already 
questionable in view of WTO obligations, see Herdegen, op.cit., pp. 391-392.  
102 von Arnauld, op.cit., p. 210 (“institutionelle Sprengkraft”); similarly Tomuschat, ‘Die EU und 
ihre völkerrechtliche Bindung’, op.cit., p. 6.  
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In sum, we have thus seen that also AG Poiares Maduro’s approach, despite 
its obvious merits, comes at a price. While the CFI was eventually qualified as a ‘false 
friend’ of international law, the Advocate General could be described as an honest 
sceptic of the international legal order. While he is safeguarding the applicant’s 
fundamental rights and preserving the autonomy of the Community legal order, he 
sacrifices in principle the commitment of 27 UN members to the UN’s system of 
collective security.  
 
The International Ramifications of the ECJ Judgement 
 
On 3 September 2008, the ECJ pronounced its judgement in the case, largely 
following the AG’s Opinion, with some significant differences, however. First, –
unsurprisingly – the starting point of the ECJ is also the autonomy of the EC legal 
order as “a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to enable 
the Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of the institutions”.103 It hereby 
follows the AG’s dualist approach, pointing out that what is being reviewed are 
Community acts and not the UN Security Council resolutions as such. However, it is 
remarkable that while explaining this, the Court makes the effort of emphasising the 
importance of international law and in particular of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.104 
This does eventually give flesh to the AG’s statements that the EC is “beholden to”105 
international law and that the two legal orders do indeed not “pass by each other 
like ships in the night”.106 From this follows, as in the AG’s Opinion, that UN Charter 
obligations, despite their overriding importance in the sphere of international law, 
cannot change the hierarchy of norms within the EC legal order, with the treaties 
and the fundamental principles enshrined therein at the top.107 Again, it is to be 
noted that the Court nonetheless dwells in its reasoning both on the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR, as well as the changes that have been effected at the UN level to 
improve the targeted sanctions regime, like the requirement to provide information 
to the listed individuals and the possibility to individually petition for re-examination of 
their case.108 The ECJ thus shows that stressing the autonomy of its own legal order 
does not have to entail ignoring whatever is happening outside of it. As a result, it 
                                                 
103 ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat, op.cit., para. 281 (referring to ECJ, Les Verts, op.cit., para. 23). 
104 Ibid., paras. 286-302. 
105 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, op.cit., para. 21. 
106 Ibid., para. 22. 
107 ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat, op.cit., para. 281. 
108 ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat, op.cit., paras. 310-325; see also UN Security Council Resolution 
1735/2006, S/Res/1735 (2006), 22 December 2006; and the UNSC Sanctions Committee’s 
guidelines, the latest version being: UN Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and 
Entities, Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work, adopted on 7 November 
2002, as amended on 10 April 2003, 21 December 2005, 29 November 2006 and 12 February 
2007, retrieved 16 July 2008, <www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf>. 
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states that under the present circumstances, a full review of the implementation 
measures against EC law would be called for and dismisses (probably to the relief of 
many public international law scholars) the CFI’s venture into its own jus cogens 
review. According to this standard of review, it goes on to detect infringements of 
the right to be heard, the right to effective judicial review and, resulting from these 
procedural deficiencies, also the right to respect for property.109 Finally, also at this 
stage of its reasoning, the ECJ demonstrates awareness of the wider context, e.g. 
the necessity of a “surprise effect” of targeted sanctions in order to prevent 
circumvention,110 or the need to strike a “fair balance” between the public interest in 
effectively combating terrorism on a global scale and the individual interest to have 
one’s property respected.111 
It is also these considerations that prompt the Court in the final part of its 
reasoning to depart from the AG’s Opinion. The Court recognizes that the immediate 
annulment of the regulation with respect to the applications “would be capable of 
seriously and irreversibly prejudicing the effectiveness of the restrictive measures [...] 
because in the interval preceding its replacement by a new regulation Mr Kadi and 
Al Barakaat might take steps seeking to prevent measures freezing funds from being 
applied to them again.”112 Furthermore, notwithstanding the infringements against 
the applicants, the ECJ underlined also that “it cannot be excluded that, on the 
merits of the case, the imposition of those measures on the appellants may for all 
that prove to be justified”. 113 Therefore, by virtue of Article 231 of the EC Treaty, the 
Court ruled that the effects of the measures should be maintained for three months, 
allowing the EC institutions to bring the implementing measures in line with EC law.114 
It should be noted that in response to the judgement, on 28 November 2008, 
Commission Regulation 1190/2008 was adopted, stating that “the Commission has 
communicated the narrative summaries of reasons provided by the UN Al-Qaida 
and Taliban Sanctions Committee, to Mr Kadi and to Al Barakaat International 
Foundation and given them the opportunity to comment on these grounds in order 
to make their point of view known.”115 After having received and considered such 
comments, the Commission ruled that the listing of Mr Kadi (and Al Barakaat) was 
justified due to association with Al-Qaida and that he should be (re-)added to the 
list. The regulation entered into force exactly three months after the ECJ judgement 
                                                 
109 ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat, op.cit., paras. 331-372.  
110 Ibid., para. 340. 
111 Ibid., para. 360. 
112 Ibid., para. 373. 
113 Ibid., para. 374. 
114 Ibid., paras. 375-376. 
115 Commission of the EC, ‘Commission Regulation (EC) No 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008 
amending for the 101st time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific 
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin 
Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban’, Official Journal of the European Union, L 322 , 
2 December 2008, pp. 25-26. 
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was pronounced. On 26 February 2009, Mr Kadi brought an action for annulment of 
Commission Regulation 1190/2008 before the CFI for essentially the same reasons as 
the originally contested regulation.116 
While from an EC law point of view that judgement is undoubtedly to be 
welcomed,117 let us now turn to the ramifications it can be expected to produce on 
the international scene, both in law and practice.118 Two observations are to be 
made in this respect, one for the short term and one for the long term. 
Firstly, for now, the ECJ’s judgement in fact managed to square the circle, or 
otherwise put, to take the best of two worlds: it adopted the AG’s legally stringent 
reasoning, but by virtue of the temporary continuation of the effects of the 
measures, it maintains, de facto, also compliance with international obligations. That 
means that the EU and its Member States continue to fulfil, for the time being, their 
obligations under the UN Charter and would have nothing to fear from the UNSC. 
However, Mr Kadi thus remains, until today, the subject of restrictive measures 
directed against him. Assuming that he would seek, next to the EC Courts, other 
legal remedies still open to him, he might either bring the matter before a national 
judge (in the EU) or the ECtHR. The former, however, is a very unpromising option, as 
he would first have to find a court willing to judge upon a matter just adjudicated by, 
and again pending before the ECJ. This would presuppose a downward ‘solanging’, 
a possibility at least alluded to publicly by the President of the German Bundesver-
fassungsgericht.119 But in view of the unlikelihood of this case (and others) actually 
making it all the way up to that court as well as the unlikely willingness of the 
Bunderverfassungsgericht to challenge both the ECJ and the UNSC, this does not 
appear as a viable option. As for the latter, official circles agree that the applicant is 
likely to (eventually) continue his case against EU Member States before the ECtHR 
as the “fourth instance”,120 just as the applicant did in Bosphorus. This upward 
‘solanging’ is more realistic and promising, because the ECtHR explicitly stated in its 
                                                 
116 CFI, ‘Action brought on 26 February 2009 – Kadi v Commission’, Case T-85/09, Official 
Journal of the European Union, C 90, 18 April 2009, p. 37. 
117 For an in-depth discussion of the judgement see e.g. T. Tridimas & J. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘EU 
Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress?’, 
College of Europe Research Papers in Law, No. 3, 2008, p. 2 (republished in the Fordham 
International Law Journal); and G. de Búrca, ‘The EU, the European Court of Justice and the 
International Legal Order after Kadi’,  Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 
1321313 (to be republished in the Harvard International Law Journal). 
118 In the course of August and September 2008, the author conducted several interviews with 
national diplomats from relevant countries and officials from the EU. As the interviewees 
requested to remain anonymous, their names will not appear in footnotes or the 
bibliography.  
119 He did so in an interview in early 2008, see T. Darnstädt, ‘Ohne Wenn und Aber: Der 
Präsident des Bundesverfassunsgerichts Hans-Jürgen Papier, 64, über die Herausforderungen 
des internationalen Terrorismus, das Folterverbot und die Grenzziehung zwischen Freiheit und 
Sicherheit’, Der Spiegel, Vol. 62, No. 3, 14 January 2008, p. 26. 
120 N. Lavranos, ‘Judicial Review of UN Sanctions by the Court of First Instance’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2006, p. 485.  
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Bosphorus judgement that it would be prepared to step in as soon as human rights 
protection elsewhere proved to be “manifestly deficient”.121 This would indeed be a 
delicate scenario since Member States could no longer use the CFI’s argument of 
the overriding importance of UN Charter obligations, as it has been rebuffed by the 
ECJ. However, as long as the case is pending before the EC Courts, it is unlikely that 
the ECtHR would intervene. In fact, in order to prevent so-called upward or 
downward ‘solanging’, what the ECJ is actually doing could be described as 
temporal ‘solanging’, or simply procrastinating the problem. 
This, however, brings us to the second observation: What if the ECJ were to 
ultimately remove Mr Kadi due to procedural defaults? Even though the ECJ makes 
sure that it does not review UN Security Council resolutions as such, the concern 
remains that this could eventually lead to the collective non-compliance of 27 UN 
members, given the temporary nature of the continuation of the effects of the 
measures and given that the subsequent measures have again been challenged. 
Without going into detail, the fact that the Commission had merely a brief exchange 
of letters with the applicants indeed does raise doubts as to whether the institutions 
now lived up to appropriate procedural standards.  
However, the real consequences of annulment and delisting and thus non-
compliance with UN Charter obligations, would not be as shocking as they may 
appear. As AG Poiares Maduro put it, legal challenges against the effects of such 
resolutions “cannot be entirely unexpected on the Security Council’s part”.122 
Indeed, in a report from 2005 the UNSC Sanctions Committee’s Monitoring Team 
acknowledged that unless something was done to improve the sanctions regime, 
there was “the possibility of one or more potentially negative court decisions that 
could hamper enforcement efforts”.123 Consequently, in its report from 2007, the 
Monitoring Team had discovered no fewer than 26 cases before domestic courts 
around the world dealing with such challenges.124 Against this backdrop, official 
circles share the view that a decision of the ECJ in this regard surely will have a 
significant announcement effect. In 2008, the Monitoring Team itself stated that the 
adoption of the AG’s position by the ECJ would create a “precedent”.125 According 
to the report, “there is a real possibility that the regulation used by the 27 Member 
                                                 
121 ECtHR, Bosphorus v Ireland, op.cit., para. 156. 
122 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, op.cit., para. 38. 
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States of the European Union to implement the sanctions will be held invalid”126 
which could “trigger similar challenges that could quickly erode enforcement”,127 
also in “other States outside the European Union.”128 Finally, in its latest report, the 
Monitoring Team took indeed note of the “long awaited decision”129 of the ECJ, 
calling it “arguably the most significant legal development to affect the regime since 
its inception”.130 It also closely followed its aftermath and will anxiously await the 
outcome of Mr Kadi’s new challenge,131 which could “give rise to new and more 
difficult issues”.132 Thus, just as the ECJ demonstrated awareness of what is going on 
outside of the EU, the UNSC seems to be equally closely following what is happening 
inside of the EU. 
However, politically speaking, as one diplomat pointed out to the author, it 
should be borne in mind that despite the binding character of Security Council 
resolutions, put mildly, this would by far not be the first time that UNSC resolutions 
would fail to be fully complied with. Further, it is obvious that the inefficacy of the 
system of collective security is already inherent in the setup of the Security Council 
with the veto right of the five permanent members. Finally, the French and British 
vetoes in the Council would most likely prevent the EU and its members from facing 
any sanctions themselves in case of non-compliance with the sanctions regime 
resulting from an ECJ judgement. 
Moreover, the ECJ’s judgement and any future judgements of this kind might 
be beneficial to the UN in the sense that additional pressure on the Security Council 
would contribute to the establishment of more transparent and fair procedures. In 
fact, pressure on the Security Council to improve the targeted sanctions regime has 
been applied for years now at the highest levels. For instance, already in 2004 the 
report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change addressed the 
issue of targeted sanctions and called for “procedures to review the cases of those 
claiming to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists.”133 In 2005, the UN 
World Summit urged “the Security Council, […] to ensure that fair and clear 
procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for 
removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions.”134 One year later, 
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the Legal Counsel at the UN Secretariat commissioned an in-depth study on 
“Targeted Sanctions and Due Process”.135 This study concluded that the sanctions 
regime should ensure four basic rights of listed persons, viz. the right to be informed 
about the measures taken against them, the right to be heard before the UNSC or 
the Sanctions Committee, the right of legal counsel and representation, and the 
right to an effective remedy before an independent body,136 basically matching 
what the ECJ is demanding from the EC’s own institutions. Later the same year, on 22 
June 2006, the Security Council organised a special debate on “strengthening 
international law: rule of law and maintenance of international peace and security”, 
a central topic of which was improving the sanctions regime.137 In this debate, the 
Legal Counsel of the UN reiterated the necessity to guarantee the four rights from 
the Fassbender study,138 and the Austrian permanent representative to the UN, 
speaking on behalf of the EU, underscored “the importance of upholding certain 
minimum standards to ensure fair and clear procedures when designing and 
implementing sanctions”139 in order to “preserve the legitimacy and reinforce the 
efficacy of the United Nations sanctions regimes”.140 
This also explains the adaptation of the sanctions regime that has been going 
on in the last years. Hence, it can safely be said that this ECJ judgement will not lead 
to the sudden and unprecedented demise of the international security architecture. 
Still, it would constitute an important apex in a continuing back-and-forth between 
the Security Council and critical voices regarding targeted sanctions throughout the 
international community. In fact, also the concerns about other countries imitating 
the ECJ’s assumed defiance of the Security Council can also be reinterpreted in a 
more positive way, as they ultimately contribute to additional pressure on the UN. 
In sum, in the long run, the EU and its Member States would have no direct 
adverse ramifications to fear from a definitive annulment of the measures in 
question, while saving at the same time their credibility regarding human rights 
protection. However, there is a real risk that this might spark (more) imitation by other 
courts outside of the EU. Then again, this would only contribute to increasing the 
pressure on the Security Council to amend its procedures, which is to be welcomed.  
But the question that directly ensues from this is: what could we then 
realistically expect the Security Council to do in order to provide for improved 
human rights protection at the UN level? As the listing and de-listing procedure 
currently stands, three of the four rights claimed by Mr Fassbender and the UN Legal 
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Counsel are lived up to. However, as the Sanctions Committee’s Monitoring Team 
points out itself, “one major issue remains: the suggestion that listing decisions by the 
Committee be subject to review by an independent panel”.141 According to the 
Team, the prospect of “any panel having more than an advisory role”142 is unrealistic. 
This assessment is confirmed by official circles, expecting insurmountable resistance 
especially from the permanent members of the UNSC. Thus, while legally the setting-
up of a special tribunal would not be a problem,143 it seems highly unlikely that the 
Security Council would establish a tribunal directed against its own actions. 
Furthermore, quite convincing practical arguments militate against such a 
permanent body, which have been outlined by Tomuschat.144 Indeed, it would be 
quite paradoxical to grant terror suspects around the world who have been subject 
to a travel ban free flights to New York or the Hague to plead their case before a 
special tribunal.145 
Against this backdrop, even though the generally preferable solution is to be 
sought at the UN level, optimism for radical change should remain limited. In view of 
the particular complexity of the issue and the jealously guarded prerogatives of the 
Security Council, the right to judicial review seems to be only approachable in an 
asymptotical manner, that is by striving for something as closely resembling a tribunal 
as possible without being one. In this context, the suggestion to install “panels of wise 
men (or women)”146 or “an independent Ombudsman”147 with mere advisory power, 
but bearing political and public authority, seems to be the most viable option to 
provide the most effective, albeit not judicial remedies.148 
Finally, the Security Council could of course easily rid itself of the problem by 
simply relying more on (semi-)autonomous sanctions, i.e. by retaining its lists, but 
leaving it up to each UN Member State’s judiciary to review the implementation 
measures taken by its respective executive branch. Should the Security Council find 
that a state abuses this freedom, it could still apply sanctions to either that state or 
the person concerned. Otherwise put, though the EC human rights standard cannot 
be transposed to the UN level (yet), another European specialty, the principle of 
subsidiarity, might prove helpful in this regard.  
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Concluding Remarks: In the Same Boat Together 
 
In the light of the foregoing, what is the answer to be given to the question posed at 
the outset? What approach is to be preferred, the AG’s where the international and 
European spheres are depicted as two ships, albeit not passing by each other 
unnoticed since trying to avoid collision, yet remaining separate vessels sailing at 
different speed? Or rather the CFI’s, where the international legal order is conceived 
of as an all-embracing hulk, with the UNSC at the helm, leaving us hoping that it will 
safely circumnavigate all the perils on the way? 
The latter approach, from a modern, globalist perspective, appears more 
appealing at first glance. But a closer look at the actual argumentation revealed too 
many leaks, leaks that ultimately make the seaworthiness of this giant ship 
questionable, while the hard-won achievement of effective human rights protection 
is simply thrown overboard. Contrariwise, while the AG’s argumentation at first 
glance seems a bit out-of-time, its legal conclusiveness at least keeps those on the 
European ship safe. But then again, what about the other, the struggling ship flying 
the light-blue flag of the UN? 
The right balance was ultimately found by the ECJ, especially when taking 
into account the international ramifications which are likely to result, both in the short 
term and in the long term. Ironically, this is so since the reality of the international 
community and its imperfect international institutions, in the face of common threats 
such as international terrorism as well as human rights violations, rather paints the 
picture of us all sitting in the same boat together after all. However, the legitimate 
and productive pressure that this ECJ ruling creates, amounts to a clear warning 
signal, still short of a mutiny, reminding the UNSC as the ‘oversteering helmsman’ of 
the international community to readjust the course of this common enterprise as far 
as possible.  
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